Brazil: Winning back WhatsApp

Brazilian backlash against temporary shutdown of social media app highlights the importance of open access to the internet  

William Carter

Over 90% of Brazilian internet users are on WhatsApp, using the free internet phone and messaging service to communicate within Brazil and abroad. Free apps like WhatsApp are vital for communication in a country like Brazil, not only because of its size but also because of the cost of its telephone plans, comparable to those of the UK despite the average Brazilian income being about two thirds lower than the UK equivalent. Crucially, Brazilians frequently use WhatsApp for work purposes, meaning the shutdown, though eventually shortened, would have caused economic damage at both an individual and national level. 

The decision to suspend the service for 48 hours within Brazil was taken by a Sao Paulo court in response to the app’s American headquarters’ refusal to place wiretaps on certain accounts. These wiretaps were to assist an ongoing drug related crime investigation in Brazil. 

Brazilians did not take kindly to this news. They responded to the crackdown on their social media freedoms through, unsurprisingly, social media - taking to Twitter in great numbers to protest the decision. Most managed to retain their sense of humour, with the hashtag '#Inthese48hoursIwill' trending and leading to comical suggestions of how Brazilians would spend their WhatsApp-free two days.   

The service was restored after 12 hours, with judge Xavier de Souza claiming that it was ‘unfair that millions of users would be effected by the inertia of the company’. However, the implications of the episode are worrying and form part of a wider debate on internet access. Threats to curtail internet use, on grounds of economics or security, have been recently emerging. In January 2015 David Cameron restated his belief that the revised ‘Snoopers’ Charter’, officially known as the Communications Data Bill, should grant the government access, in the interests of national security, to content sent over apps such as Snapchat and WhatsApp, and that such information be held for 12 months. Cameron proposed that, in the case of WhatsApp or Snapchat’s refusal, the apps be banned in the UK. Whether it is likely or even possible that these apps would surrender their encrypted data remains to be seen, but events in Brazil set a precedent for kneejerk blanket bans of apps and internet access in emergencies. 

More recently, Republican presidential hopeful Donald Trump suggested that in the fight against ISIS he would ‘certainly be open to closing areas where we are at war with somebody’. He too is suspicious of encryption and has suggested ‘shutting down’ internet access in ISIS-controlled Iraq and Syria in order to curb ISIS recruitment in America and disrupt their propaganda output in general. In fact, shutting down local internet access is actually something ISIS is currently doing in parts of their territory, in efforts to slow the spread of activist journalism, such as the Raqqa Is Being Slaughtered Silently movement. Trump’s plans, though potentially feasible, seem crude, and may harm the efforts of those fighting against ISIS, such as the Kurds, more than they harm ISIS itself.   

Access to social media, such as Twitter and Facebook is vital, especially in developing and undemocratic countries, for its ability (admittedly sometimes misused) to inform, connect and rally. The use of Twitter, Facebook and YouTube in the Arab Spring is an oft-cited example of the ability of social media to provide frameworks of organisation and resistance in difficult situations, where traditional means of communication are either too slow or may be blocked. was often disrupted, Social media during conflicts in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, for example, gave activists and regular citizens a platform of communication more free from government influence than state controlled TV and radio.

In Brazil itself, the internet has played revolutionary roles in the recent liberalisation of the country following the end of João Figueiredo’s military regime in 1985. Brazil’s ground-breaking 2014 internet usage law, Marco Civil, guarantees data protection and is a step towards net neutrality and enabling the anonymity of free speech, in a country in which anonymous free speech is constitutionally prohibited.  The legislation was drafted collaboratively online, while Facebook was crucial for organising the protests in advance of the 2014 World Cup.  The internet has provided Brazilians a platform to criticise politicians and political corruption, such as the recent Petrobras oil scandal, openly and to a much wider audience. As such, Brazil’s conservative congress is trying to amass support for a crackdown on social media, and to make it easier for the government to obtain privately shared content. 

Whilst Brazil has protected the internet freedoms of its citizens this time, it seems internet access is going to remain an ongoing political and economic issue. 

Breaking the Barrier for U.S.-Cuba Academic Relations

Allen Schaidle

In July, the White House announced to vastly loosen travel, commerce, and investment restrictions previously imposed against Cuba. This signaled a new era for U.S.-Cuban affairs after nearly 50 years of estrangement from one another ended in December 2014. Cuba’s proximity, combined with the loosening of Communist Party control, underlines a fundamental moment to strengthen Cuban society and resurrect the country from economic turmoil. The White House will begin to issue travel visas more liberally: such licenses will remain within the preexisting categories, yet the number of U.S. visitors is expected to increase dramatically. Notably, this will allow a greater influx of students on educational exchanges, thus furthering the potential for U.S.-Cuban academic diplomacy

Academic relations, particularity those involving institutions of higher education, are effective and meaningful methods of interstate connections. As demonstrated by similar cases, such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, China, Vietnam, and the United Arab Emirates, higher education exchanges have significantly contributed to developing and securing international relationships. Indeed, the countries with which the U.S. engages the largest student exchanges are additionally some of the most vital economic allies for the U.S. (such as China, South Korea, and Saudi Arabia). Such initiatives are not only pursued by the U.S., but also have a rich history in European higher education. Prior to their introduction into the European Union (EU), central and eastern European countries participated in education and training programs with their western EU neighbors, in hopes of solidifying their position for EU membership. Investing in U.S.-Cuban academic relations can potentially improve economic and political ties, foster greater understanding of Cuban society, and provide each country with new educational opportunities. The U.S. has the chance to cultivate foreign relations with Cuba once again and the importance of academic connections should not be overlooked. 

Previous academic relations with Cuba suggest that it may be a fruitful partnership to enter once again. While remaining a sub-category of wider diplomacy, they were key in fostering generational integration between the two countries and developing cultural understandings. In 1961, the U.S. severed diplomatic relations with Cuba after Fidel Castro signed a trade agreement with the former Soviet Union. Following the Cuban Missile crisis in 1962, presidential administrations fluctuated in the restrictions imposed on travel to and relations with Cuba. Consequently, the number of Cuban students studying at U.S. higher education institutions plummeted and American scholars overwhelmingly lost access to Cuba. The loss of scholarship resulted in American scholars, diplomats, politicians, and the wider public distancing themselves from Cuban society. With the distance, stereotypes regarding Cuban society flourished and political discourse became essentially nonexistent. Despite never explicitly prohibiting academic relations, Cuba’s status as a “hostile” country brought them to a dramatic halt. 

A glimmer of hope for renewing U.S.-Cuban academic diplomacy emerged during former President Clinton’s administration. Through Clinton’s initiatives and his Track II policy, between the years of 1993-2001, relations improved in a manner unlike any previous administration. During this period, an average of 30-40 Cuban researchers from the University of Havana traveled to the U.S. monthly. In addition, near the end of Clinton’s second term, educational partnerships amplified: roughly 760 American institutions of higher education requested licenses for student exchanges with Cuba from the Treasury Department. In addition, Cuba became the 14th most favorable destination for American students studying abroad. The benefits of Clinton’s administration efforts lasted into former President George W. Bush’s first term. 

However, following the growth of the Republican party in the early 2000s, Bush’s administration delivered a new blow to the already withered U.S.-Cuban relations by restricting academic programs to Cuba to only long-term programs (whole semester or longer). As a result, the number of American students and scholars willing to participate dropped due to the time commitment and stronger travel restrictions. Bush’s administration froze academic exchanges with Cuba, directly ignoring the advice from his Secretary of State, Colin Powell, on the importance of such exchanges in developing cultural perspectives within American citizens. Fast-forward to 2004, academic relations reached rock bottom with only 169 educational exchange participants (e.g. research participants or students on study-abroad schemes) between the U.S. and Cuba recorded by the Institute of International Education (IIE), down from 2,148 just the previous year. 

Referencing the most recent IIE data, the number of Cuban students enrolled in U.S. higher education institutions in 2014 was only 69. While in recent decades the number of Cuban students studying in the U.S. has been fairly stable due to strict licensing of student visas, the influx in educational exchange participants radically fluctuated due to the shifting policies of earlier presidential administrations. Without meaningful and consistent student exchanges, academic relations floundered and are thus where the U.S. needs to focus. Student exchanges are crucial for fostering younger generations with new cultural and international perspectives outside of their native countries. 

As relations thaw, Florida’s higher education institutions can lead. Only 90 miles from Cuba and with a high concentration of Cuban-Americans, Florida is geographically and culturally best prepared. Florida International University and the University of Miami have already shown an eagerness to increase student exchanges with Cuba’s nearly three-dozen higher education institutions. In addition, they have even hinted at the potential construction of branch campuses in Havana. However, the Florida Board of Governors continues to restrict travel, especially educational excursions, to Cuba, despite federal renewal of diplomatic relations, through the state’s “Travel to Terrorist States Act.” This came during the post-9/11 years where fears among Americans were exploited by Republicans to advance their political agendas. Passed in 2006, the bill largely affects Florida public higher education institutions because their funding is intimately connected to the state's government. Thus, public higher education institutions are unwilling to contest the state government in fear of losing state allowances. Integrating Florida higher education institutions into Cuba can act as the initial step needed for further academic relations. 

Quality assurance is vital for American higher education institutions. With the renewal of U.S.-Cuban academic relations (branch campuses, student study away sites, research centers), relations in Cuba must ensure that high-quality educational experiences and academic freedom prevails. Without these, important cultural exchanges or diplomatic developments will not follow. This entails monitoring the nature of teaching, research, and educational experiences on both sides of the exchanges. In previous academic relations abroad, this has proven troublesome for institutions. For example, the establishment of New York University-Shanghai highlights the difficultly in achieving standards, particularly in teaching facets. Attracting professors to teach abroad is often expensive, and many academics are hesitant to commit to teaching in countries where academic freedom is questionable. If such relations emerge in the following years, the U.S. must remain conscious to avoid oppression of academic voices speaking out against Cuba’s Communist Party, which we have witnessed in Sino-American academic relations.  

Cuban students largely lack access to university entrance exams. This June marked the first time five Cuban students enrolled to take the Test of English as a Foreign Language (TOEFL) in Havana, a test offered and administered by New Jersey based non-profit Educational Testing Service (ETS). ETS should followwith tests such as the American College Test (ACT), Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT), Graduate Record Examination (GRE), and Graduate Management Admission Test (GMAT) in order to help Cuban students applying to U.S. institutions. Once access has been increased to Cuban students regarding these admission tests, deeper student exchanges will follow. However, American institutions should not directly impose American admission processes on Cuban students, but rather mix American and Cuban admission practices. While this might cause some initial confusion in navigating application processes, it will avoid imposing unfamiliar admission processes on one population as opposed to another. This way, if branch campuses are to follow, admission processes will not favour one population over another and both American and Cuban students will experience a novel admission experience. 

Before forging fresh U.S.-Cuban academic relations, institutions should take advantage of academic connections previously established by non-governmental organisations (NGOs). This should not side heavily with science-orientated pathways, but needs to be inclusive of all disciplines. NGOs like the Ford Foundation, Social Science Research Council, World Affairs Council, and IIE all have previous initiatives focused on Cuba. These pathways can guide the navigation for future academic relations and serve as the foundation.   

Cultural awareness and respect toward Cuban society must be a priority in all U.S.-Cuban relations. Furthering academic relations can be a great accomplishment, but otherwise meaningless, if the connections disregard Cuba’s rich and warm culture. Despite lacking material resources, Cuban academic institutions offer intellectual and cultural resources through their academic scholars and students. If U.S.-Cuban academic partnerships can be successfully nurtured in a culturally cognisant manner, the renewed relations with Cuba can lead to innumerable, mutually beneficial possibilities. 

A year of progress: Afghanistan and Pakistan tackle the Taliban together

Hubert Cruz

At the start of 2015, the hopes of ending Taliban violence in Afghanistan and Pakistan were dim. Thirteen years after the overthrow of the Taliban regime, Afghanistan is still haunted by the insurgency, with almost 3,700 civilian deaths recorded in the previous year. Similarly, in Pakistan, the Peshawar school attack in 2014 left the entire nation in shock. 

The deep levels of mistrust between Afghanistan and Pakistan has often made mutual cooperation to neutralise the Taliban threat seem like a distant hope. Since the Taliban’s inception in 1994, the Pakistani army had provided substantial military and financial assistance to support its operations in Afghanistan and played a critical role in ousting the Afghan civilian government in the late 1990s. Although Pakistan claimed to have ceased supporting the group after the September 11 attacks, it remains a widely held belief that the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), a major intelligence agency of the Pakistani government, continues to shelter Taliban militants in major cities, such as Quetta and Karachi, and maintain ties with senior members of the group.

Nevertheless, in recent years, Pakistan has also suffered from the rise of the new insurgent group friendly to the Taliban movement in Afghanistan, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The TTP is based along the Afghan-Pakistani border, particularly the Federally Administered Tribal Areas in Pakistan. The TTP attack on the Peshawar school seemed to mark an end to the Pakistani government's distinction of “good” and “bad” Taliban - the former referring to those attacking Afghanistan and the latter, those attacking Pakistan. Thus, the Pakistani government decided to round up Taliban and other insurgent groups in North Waziristan, who previously used the region as a base for strikes in Afghanistan - a significant departure from Pakistan's traditional policy.

The Afghan government has also taken active steps to patch up its relation with Pakistan. Since taking office in September 2014, President Ashraf Ghani has broken away from former President Hamid Karzai's antagonistic attitude to Pakistan. In an attempt to ease Pakistan’s apprehension of Afghanistan’s pro-India tendency, Ghani refused India’s offer to supply weaponry to Afghanistan. In addition, Ghani deployed forces to fight the TTP alongside Pakistan. Ghani’s gambit soon paid dividends as the Pakistani government was able to persuade the Taliban to take part in negotiations with the Afghan government, signifying a major breakthrough in the peace process. 

Such gestures offer glimmers of hope of eventual peace in the region. Nevertheless, factors remain that threaten the fragile and nascent peace process. For one, Ghani has faced internal criticism for cooperation with Pakistan. Suffering of Afghan citizens at the hands of Pakistani-supported Taliban forces has led to resentment towards Pakistan. With pressure from many sides, it is conceivable that Ghani might choose to abandon peace talks with Pakistan out of political expediency.

On the other side of the table, the Taliban is also divided over the peace talks. During negotiations in Murree, Pakistan, some Taliban officials claimed that those attending only represent the factions close to the ISI, not the entirety of the group. A day before the second round of negotiations, the death of the Taliban's founding leader, Mullah Omar struck the heart of the group with strife and chaos. High-ranking members accused the elected replacement, Mullah Mansour, for being responsible for the death of Omar and a subsequent cover-up. In December 2015, the Afghan government claimed that Mansour was seriously injured in a gun fight with other Taliban fighters, and later died of his injuries. The Taliban deny such claims and the disagreement threatens to end peace talks. 

On the eve of the new year, the people of Afghanistan and Pakistan will certainly have more reasons to be hopeful for lasting peace than twelve months ago. Nevertheless, the journey that lies ahead in 2016 will undoubtedly be tumultuous and fraught with complications. 

The Missing Voice in the Syrian Civil War

Adam Porter

In international coverage of the ongoing crisis in Syria, there is a surprising absence: Israel. For decades, Israel has been closely identified with the quagmire of Middle Eastern politics: the perpetual tension with Palestine occupying, in the popular imagination, the role of an analogy to the region’s wider problems. Yet if Israel was once the poster-boy for regional strife, it is no longer. That mantle is undoubtedly, and tragically, taken by Syria. Nevertheless, Israel remains conspicuously absent, seemingly disengaged from the crisis on its doorstep.

Disengagement makes sense, however, when one considers the choices before Israel. On the one hand is Daesh, ostensibly the ‘Islamic State’: a death cult committed to the elimination of both the Jewish state, and the Jewish people. On the other hand, the Syrian Government, a long-standing opponent accused of arming Hezbollah, and which still claims territory in the Golan Heights. Israel, in consequence, is content for its many enemies to shed one another’s blood, leaving each either too weak, or else too distracted, to pose a threat.

Unfortunately, this explanation cannot fully capture why Israel remains disengaged. Doubtless western powers are equally content to see Assad and Daesh exhaust themselves in a protracted conflict, but have nonetheless opted to take action. The difference, quite possibly, lies in that unlike Israel, western nations feel an obligation to assist regional partners, especially Iraq, given their deep and contentious involvement in recent conflicts. Israel, bereft of allies, has faced no such call to arms, and has found disengagement more attractive as a consequence.

A further, and perhaps the key, element to the story is domestic. For one, Israelis have not faced attacks by Daesh like those in Tunisia and Paris, and have not been motivated by the resulting clamour for action that was most recently noted in the British parliament. Crucially, Israel has been, and remains still, far more likely to face terrorist attacks planned from Gaza and the West Bank than from Syria. The defining relationship in Israeli foreign affairs (or domestic, depending on one’s perspective) is surely that with Palestine. In consequence, Israel’s overriding priority is domestic security, and Israel’s foreign policy, manifest in what some commentators have called a ‘siege mentality’, is an expression of this desire for security. In this sense, disengagement, neutrality in Syria is not incongruous with Israel’s prominence in the region, but rather consistent with Israel’s long-standing foreign policy, focused on the maintenance of domestic security.

Given Israel’s focus on the domestic, it is unsurprising that they have not as yet decided to intervene in Syria, given that neither Assad, nor Daesh, have yet struck out against Israel. Daesh, however, facing airstrikes in Iraq and Syria, increasingly reaches out beyond its borders to inflict violence abroad, with one Israeli official describing a Daesh attack in Israel as ‘Only a matter of time’. This is more likely hyperbole than sense. However, it illuminates a crucial conclusion: that while Israel remains a missing voice in the Syrian crisis at present, events that threaten Israel’s domestic security may yet find this voice being raised.

Farewell China: Hong Kong rises to stand on its own feet

Hubert Cruz

In October, the Hong Kong Football Association was fined CHF5000 by FIFA over supporters booing the Chinese national anthem in a World Cup qualifying match. Undeterred by FIFA’s punishment, Hong Kong fans jeered at the anthem again when they hosted China for another World Cup qualifier a month later. Banners in every corner that read “Hong Kong is not China” captured the attention of the international media. 

The use of sport events, especially football matches, to express the sentiments of fans on national and political divides is not unheard of. What is more surprising is the drastic change of the Hong Kong people’s national identity in less than two decades after the city was returned to Chinese control. The society’s shift from embracing motherland to rejecting Chinese identity could well be explained by Beijing’s attempt to tighten its grip on the city after the handover.

On reunification in 1997, Beijing promised that the people of Hong Kong could preserve their way of life under the “one country, two systems” principle. This means Hong Kong would adopt a separate political and economic system from the mainland where the rights and freedoms of citizens would continue to be safeguarded. In addition, the Hong Kong government would enjoy a high degree of autonomy over its domestic affairs, and universal suffrage would eventually be implemented. The pledge reassured Hong Kong society that its relatively open and democratic system would not be compromised under the city’s new status.

Nevertheless, the presence of Chinese influence in Hong Kong has grown more and more pervasive. In 2012, the Beijing-appointed government sought to introduce a national education curriculum that portrayed the Communist Party of China as “progressive, selfless and united”. The policy was considered blatant brainwashing and triggered massive protests, forcing the government to back down. Deliberate attempt to foster affinity to the mainland only highlighted the differences in values between Hong Kong and China.

Furthermore, Beijing provoked huge social discontent by unilaterally settling Chinese citizens in Hong Kong. After the handover, the Chinese authorities devised the “one way permit” scheme that allowed certain Chinese citizens to apply for settlement in Hong Kong. The policy was conducted without the consent of Hong Kong’s immigration authorities, and continues to take place to this day. Since then, the number of mainland immigrants has surged to 760,000, equivalent to more than 10% of the city’s population. The policy has been criticised as a stampede on Hong Kong’s autonomy that resembles settler colonialism, and has significantly strained Hong Kong’s education, housing and welfare system.

Beijing’s well-known intolerance to dissent is embodied by its repeated obstruction to adopt universal suffrage in Hong Kong. It continues to pull the strings and interfere with the autonomy of the city through a puppet government. Having seen the promises of “one country, two systems” reneged on every possible front, the rage of Hong Kong eventually burst out and the people took to the streets last year, after Beijing imposed stringent restrictions on the next Chief Executive election that implied only Beijing’s preferred candidate could win. 

Thought the 79-day Umbrella Revolution did not result in any substantial democratisation, the disillusionment of the Hong Kong society to Chinese rule was apparent. Many civic organisations and political parties have been established with the mission to preserve local culture and defend the city’s core values from Chinese encroachment. They have raised public awareness on issues that were previously neglected, such as the displacement of Cantonese by Mandarin in schools, and the disturbance to local communities by Chinese parallel traders. While advocacy for self-determination remains at a nascent stage, there is growing consensus that Hong Kong needs to escape Chinese rule.

In the end, Hong Kong held China to a goalless draw, leaving both teams unlikely to progress to the next stage of the tournament. At the same time, FIFA has also initiated a new investigation into the fans’ behaviour, with harsher punishment expected to be handed down. Despite the adversities, the people of Hong Kong have never been prouder to support their team.