Why the US-backed coalition in Yemen is a threat to peace

WILL YELDHAM, WRITING FOR THE ORGANISATION FOR WORLD PEACE

When the Romans conquered Modern day Yemen they named it Arabia Felix or "Happy Arabia". However, the ongoing civil war, worsening humanitarian crisis and frustration of peace negotiations by neighbouring countries renders this description a dark ironic joke.

On Wednesday 1st July 2015, the United Nations designated the war in Yemen as a Level 3 humanitarian crisis, its most severe category. The U.S. responded the day after by issuing a joint press statement by department spokesperson John Kirby arguing for "a pause" in fighting which “would allow international aid organisations to deliver urgently needed food, medicine, and fuel to citizens throughout Yemen”. However, if the situation in Yemen is going to improve the international community needs to do more than simply issue nagging press releases.

There have been repeated attempts to end the conflict through negotiation, however each has collapsed through a combination of poor commitment from the warring factions involved and increasing meddling by neighbouring countries. These are split between the 10 states in an anti-Houthi coalition led by Saudi Arabia, and Iran, which has been waging a relentless PR campaign condemning the coalition. As a result, first the National Dialogue then the Riyadh Conference and now the recent Geneva conference have all disintegrated without result.

Recent UN investigations have revealed the humanitarian toll this unceasing conflict is having upon the civilian population. UN agencies say that, since March, 4.4 million people have received assistance, but this is only a fraction of those who desperately need help. The violence has killed more than 2,800 people, displaced one million and left more than 21 million people, 80 percent of the population, in need of some form of humanitarian aid and or protection. The Saudi-led coalition has also enforced a naval blockade which has prevented essential aid from reaching those in need. Both Yemeni military and Houthi are also accused of child conscription by UNICEF and Islamic relief. Indeed, in November 2009, over 400 children walked to the UNDP office in Sana’a to protest against the alleged Houthi abuse of children’s rights.

Modern Yemen was created in 1990 when North Yemen and Communist South Yemen merged and was tested during a brief civil war in 1994. However, regional tensions resurfaced in the summer of 2009 when government troops and Houthi rebels from the Shia Zaidi sect clashed in the north, killing hundreds and displacing more than a quarter of a million people. The recent, and frankly unexpected, success of Houthi rebels in capturing vast swathes of the country including the capital Sanaa led first to Hadi’s resignation on January 22 and subsequent flight to Saudi Arabia in February. The Houthis then declared themselves in full control of the government on 6 February, dissolving parliament and putting a Revolutionary Committee led by Mohammed Ali al-Houthi in charge of the country

In response, several states led by Saudi Arabia also mounted a military intervention in Yemen codenamed "Operation Decisive Storm". The Saudi-led coalition sided with Hadi’s government in exile and have been shelling Houthi positions from land and sea and hitting them with airstrikes. These have had a disastrous effect on civilians and on the country’s infrastructure with refugee camps and UNESCO heritage sites also targeted. The US is openly supporting the coalition by "providing intelligence sharing, targeting assistance, advisory and logistical support". Indeed, Human Rights Watch has even accused the US of supplying CBU-105 cluster munitions, prohibited in international law. The bombing has allegedly been scaled back as part of a new initiative "Operation Restoring Hope" however strikes continue to plague civilians and hamper humanitarian efforts by damaging airports such as Sana’a and Al Hudaya essential for transporting food and medical supplies.

The reasons for US involvement are largely strategic and have less to do with restoring a democratic government than preventing Iran’s growing power in the region. Anthony Cordesman, a military analyst at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, stated that “The US ‘doesn’t want to see a threat to the [Bab Al Mandeb] strait and something that could affect the security of the Suez Canal". The U.S is so concerned with curbing Iranian control of the Bab Al Mandeb strait that they are unwittingly paving the way for Daesh control which would threaten global shipping through the Suez and provide Daesh with a massive source of revenue in tolls. Instead of simply attempting to bomb the rebels into submission, the anti-Houthi factions, be it Hadi’s government, the Saudi Coalition or the US, need to focus primarily on diplomatic solutions that don’t further harm civilians and economically cripple Yemen.

Admittedly, the most recent diplomatic endeavours in Geneva yielded little however this was principally the fault of the respective combatants and should in no way be taken as an indication that no diplomatic resolution can be found. The Geneva talks broke down before they ever got started; the two parties never even made it into the same room as each other. Even if they’d managed to get through the door, both sides chose to send second-tier political leaders to Geneva, with full knowledge that such leaders would not be able to make significant concessions or breakthroughs on their own.

U.N Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon’s appeal for a two-week humanitarian truce on the occasion of the Holy Month of Ramadan was simply cast aside by Ahmed al-Masiri, the leader of the Southern Resistance forces loyal to Hadi. He retorted that a humanitarian truce was "out of the question", stating "Ramadan is a holy month in which jihad is permissible". The fundamental problem was that the factions loyal to Hadi proposed such extortionate grounds for a ceasefire that the Houthi rebels could never have accepted them. While the Houthis sought a mutual ceasefire, the Saudis demanded nothing less than total surrender as the precondition for negotiations. Given that the Houthis have suffered relatively few territorial losses since the Saudis began their campaign, this was evidently never going to happen. However, this was no accident and was indicative of a lack of true commitment to ceasefire and negotiation on the part of the coalition. This ambivalence was echoed by Al-Masri who flippantly stated “We agreed [to come to Geneva] to please the UN, so that they don’t say we are against peace or that we are stubborn”. In such an atmosphere negotiation was impossible and will continue to be so unless the international community acts. The UN must stop pussyfooting around proposing talks doomed to failure and enforce ceasefire negotiations with the threat of economic sanctions and a peacekeeping operation. The possibility of peace being enforced in the current situation, with Houthi control of Yemen, would drive Hadi and the Saudi Coalition to the table.

Saudi Arabia and its allies (including Britain and the US) must also be held accountable for the atrocities committed in their bombing campaign. At the very least the U.S must cease supplying illegal munitions for use in Yemen. The Houthi rebels have displaced a democratic government, but simply carpet bombing the country isn’t going to get rid of them. Indeed, the impact of the bombing upon Houthi forces has been slight where as the damage to essential infrastructure has been devastating. A reduction in the bombing campaign and an actual commitment to diplomatic proceedings will not only have humanitarian benefits but also limit the potential expansion of Daesh into Yemen. If the Houthis are suddenly forced back and Hadi’s Sunni government weakly re-established in charge of an economically crippled country with divided security forces Yemen will be an easy target for Daesh at which point the US coalition against the Islamic State will start bombing them instead. A reduction in bombing will also allow humanitarian aid greater access to the country which will repair infrastructural damage, which can hopefully stem the tide of refugees fleeing the conflict and economically burdening neighbouring countries.

As late as September last year, President Obama was calling Yemen a bastion of successful anti-terrorism policy. Speaking in defence of “using our air power and our support for partner forces on the ground” he cited Yemen as an example of where this tactic has been “successfully pursued … for years”. The irony here is paramount, not only is Yemen not a bastion of counter terrorism, it looks set to become increasingly dominated by Daesh if the bombing campaign lauded by Obama continues. For the moment at least his comments are as ambitious as the Romans' "Arabia Felix".

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Child Soldiers in South Sudan

Reports reveal further human rights abuses and child conscription

Will Yeldham, writing for the Organisation for World Peace

On June 29th the UN released a new report detailing not only ongoing child conscription by the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA), but also how attempts to verify first hand accounts were prevented by the SPLA. Members of the UN mission in Sudan (UNMISS) interviewed 115 victims and eyewitnesses in Unity State, which has been the sight of heavy fighting in recent months.  They recorded how the conflict has become characterised by 'new brutality and intensity' such as the allegation that SPLA soldiers raped then torched girls alive inside their homes. Indeed, The U.N. children’s agency also stated earlier this month that that warring forces have carried out horrific crimes against children, including castration, rape and tying them together before slitting their throats.
This corroborates the most recent report by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development. IGAD is ostensibly a trading bloc of 8 east African countries but has also provided a key platform to debate economic and security issues plaguing the region. Members of IGAD's monitoring and verification mechanism described how Major General Johnson Olony and Shilluk Militia, affiliated to SPLA, had "carried out forcible recruitment of an estimated 500-1000 youth, many of whom were children aged between 13 and 17 years". This took place between 7-9 June, when militias conducted house to house searches of Kodok and Wau Shilluk, and is only one example from the lengthy report listing similar violations.

South Sudan gained independence in 2011; however, the present conflict was sparked in 2013 when forces loyal to President Salva Kiir tried to put down an uprising led by his former deputy, Riek Machar.  In the resulting civil conflict thousands of people have been killed and almost two million displaced.  There has been renewed fighting after peace talks between the factions disintegrated in March this year and the SPLA launched a major offensive in April with fierce fighting in Unity State's northern Mayom district. 
The problems facing the international community in reducing violence and quelling the resulting human rights abuses are twofold. Firstly, the present difficulties in effectively punishing generals responsible has engendered a dangerous lack of accountability. The UN and its member states have spent many years encouraging the demobilisation of child soldiers in the region and supported the creation of the government's national Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Commission. However, in the case of warlord David Yau Yau, UNICEF is in fact funding the reintegration of 1755 boys in his militia after he signed a peace deal that bagged him a high ranking government job. Indeed, the threat of culpability was so slight that Yau Yau gave the approximate number of children in his militia as twice that of what the DDRC found and released. Government officials who subsequently gave each of Yau Yau's soldiers monetary gifts only reinforced the benefits of child soldiering and in fact drew more children into the ranks ahead of planned release ceremonies.

All this means that, despite the illegality of the use and conscription of children under 18 in South Sudanese law, it appears as a legitimate method of recruitment to commanders on both sides of the conflict. 
Secondly, the hampering of UN investigations by SPLA forces must not be tolerated. The UN states that attempts to corroborate the eyewitness accounts featured in its most recent report were hampered by the SPLA who denied their teams access to the areas under question. "We call on the SPLA to fulfil this commitment and allow our human rights officers unfettered access to the sites of these reported violations," said Ellen Margrethe Loej, the head of UNMISS. However, the military spokesperson for the SPLA Philip Aguer Panyang stated that the accusations made in the UN report were in need of further verification and denied that troops had interfered with UN investigations stating: "Our role as an army is to facilitate humanitarian deliveries and access for civilian protection". Such denials only serve to hamper efforts to highlight and undermine the ongoing abuses. 

Both these issues lend credence to Human Rights Watch's comment that “military and political leaders on all sides have failed to make any serious attempt to reduce abuses committed by their forces, or to hold them to account”. It must be the task of the UN and the wider international community to force serious reduction in human rights violations through targeted sanctions, the proposed arms embargo and diplomatic pressure.

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The United Nations’ Approach to Freedom of Expression

Resolution 16/18 and the Istanbul Process

Amelia Cooper

Saudi Arabia is notorious for its flagrant disregard of human rights, and has recently faced renewed international criticism for upholding Raif Badawi’s unjustifiable sentence of 1000 lashes and 10 years in prison for establishing a progressive blog that called for religious tolerance and women’s rights. Incarcerated on the grounds of ‘insulting Islam’, Badawi is a prisoner of conscience: his “crime” is exercising his right to freedom of expression. Saudi Arabia was therefore a surprising and unlikely choice of location for the last meeting of the Istanbul Process, a series of conferences dedicated to the combating of religious intolerance.

The Istanbul Process was created with the intention of ensuring the full and consensual implementation of United Nations Human Rights Council 16/18, entitled ‘Combating Incitement to hatred, discrimination and violence based on religion or belief’. The resolution, adopted in 2011 and reaffirmed in subsequent years, most recently in March 2015, marked a movement away from the problematic and divisive concept of “defamation of religions”. The “defamation of religions” agenda sought to protect religions, rather than religious adherents: such a position stands at odds with the notion of human rights, which (as one might expect) are afforded to individuals, rather than ideas.

Resolution 16/18 committed states to pursuing a rights-based approach in tackling discrimination, incitement and intolerance, and was justly celebrated by states and civil society actors alike. The resolution is practical in two ways; it calls upon states to ‘encourage the creation of collaborative networks’ and create a governmental mechanism to ‘identify and address potential areas of tension between members of different religious communities’, and furthermore encourages the training of governmental officials in effective outreach. The Istanbul Process is one such network, the essence of it being to further ‘a result orientated engagement’. It has convened delegates, experts and civil society actors five times since the adoption of 16/18. However, incidents of religious discrimination remain prevalent and are increasing worldwide, reinforced and legitimised by harsh blasphemy laws.

One need only glance at the international news to see that the goals of 16/18 and the Istanbul Process remain elusive: from the atrocities committed by the so-called Islamic State, to the persecution of minorities in Myanmar, to rising Islamophobia and anti-Semitism in the West, it is clear that there is a long way to go. It would, of course, be unrealistic to have hoped that the four years since the resolution’s adoption could have eliminated all sectarian conflict. However, Resolution 16/18 ‘represents the only universally-agreed policy framework to guide the international community’s response’ (though as we see below, universally does not mean unanimously): the gulf between state commitments and practical application is therefore unacceptable, and requires immediate redress. Much attention has been given to both technical and normative guidance, including the development of instruments such as the Rabat Plan of Action, which outlines the scope of state obligations under Article 20 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). The outcome of a four year initiative led by the Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights, the Rabat Plan provides further clarification on the obligations of states (and responsibilities of other actors, including the media) regarding the prohibition of incitement to violence, hostility and discrimination. At the crux of the implementation gap, therefore, is not an information deficit or an absence of instruction: it is a lack of state will. 

Demonstrating State commitment to Resolution 16/18 must surely begin with ensuring that domestic legislation is in accordance with the international legal provisions with regard to freedom of religion or belief and freedom of expression. However, de facto blasphemy laws continue to exist in 55 countries, 39 of which punish the “crime” with incarceration. The international human rights consensus is clear: the use of blasphemy laws necessarily violates international law. The Human Rights Committee’s General Comment 34, in the authoritative interpretation of states’ obligations under Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights explicitly repudiated the “defamation of religions” agenda.  Furthermore, numerous NGOs have noted that blasphemy laws heighten interfaith and inter-communal animus and serve to legitimise extrajudicial violence: they are the antithesis of the environment of respect and rights that 16/18 seeks to create. Yet more shocking is that apostasy is met with the death sentence in 13 countries – and, in a glaring expression of hypocrisy, four of those thirteen states are current members of the UN Human Rights Council – including Saudi Arabia.

The Istanbul Process convened last week in Jeddah, and was hosted by the Organisation of Islamic Co-operation. I spoke to Andrew Smith, legal officer and UN Representative at Article 19, who attended the conference: his primary concern was the persistence of a fundamental disagreement as to what Resolution 16/18 represents. Where it appeared that the (bulk of) Western states consider Resolution 16/18 and the concomitant guidelines as forming the final framework to address questions of freedom of expression and freedom of religion or belief, most OIC members seemed to treat it as a compromise position, the terms and interpretation of which remain up for debate. In essence, one side considers the foundations to have been set, while the other seeks a redrawing of the boundaries: they are operating on different ideological planes.

Such a sentiment was echoed by Sejal Parmar, international human rights lawyer, specialising in freedom of expression, based at the Central European University, Budapest. She noted that the scope and meaning of freedom of expression, particularly in its interface with insult and incitement (two distinct but frequently conflated terms), remains one of the most intractable controversies at the Council. The passage of Resolution 16/18 by consensus is by no means representative of a unanimous opinion on the boundaries of freedom of expression: these remain highly contested, and the movement away from discussions on defamation of religious has simply meant that the conflict has moved into different arenas besides the increasingly fraught Istanbul Process to issues such as “traditional values” or the “family”. That said, the reappearance of the defamation of religions agenda at the Council is far from impossible. What is required for the realisation of the goals of Resolution 16/18 and the Istanbul Process is a legislative and policy change within states, which depends on an attitudinal change: how to achieve this is the most important, and difficult, question that the Council faces.

During our conversations, Smith and Parmar noted a number of issues pertaining to the Istanbul Process, the redress of which could ameliorate the implementation gap. First, Smith commented on the high-level nature of the debate: rather than Ministers of Home Affairs or Culture being present (i.e. the individuals who would be responsible for enacting the changes encouraged by the Istanbul Process), states were represented by delegates and ambassadors. From this emerges a certain psychology: if the personnel of the Process tend to be international representatives (who have frequented the halls of the UN), they will operate in this area of expertise. It is in fact domestic policymakers who have the power to implement the guidance of Resolution 16/18, and therefore their engagement is of paramount importance. Parmar furthered this in noting that the conference only lasted for a day and a half: the Istanbul Process should be the time for hard policy and guidance development, rather than being treated as a talking shop.

Secondly, Smith noted that very few of the original diplomats engaged in the drafting of Resolution 16/18 were present, while Parmar commented that the Istanbul Process’ status appeared to have degenerated somewhat. When considered in the context of its time, the resolution was a dramatic rejection of an agenda that had been pursued for over a decade: its landmark significance must not be forgotten.

Finally, both Smith and Parmar noted that accusations of double standards continued to be levied by both the West and the OIC. The aforementioned irony of holding a conference on freedom of expression while Raif Badawi is arbitrarily imprisoned, facing cruel and inhumane punishment, was raised by a number of civil society actors, and quickly brushed aside by those managing the meetings. Since upholding Badawi’s sentence and facing renewed international outcry, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has released a statement that it ‘will not tolerate such outrageous, ridiculous interference in its sovereign justice system’. Furthermore, the explicit protection afforded to atheists and non-believers in General Comment 22 to Article 18 of the ICCPR (‘Article 18 protects theistic, non-theistic and atheistic beliefs, as well as the right not to profess any religion or belief’) has not gained traction with the majority of OIC states: references to minority groups continue to focus on theists. However, criticisms on the grounds of duplicity were equally levied towards European states, notably with regard to the unequal treatment of anti-Semitic and Islamophobic incidents. Members of the OIC also highlighted the persistence of blasphemy laws in Western countries: while many of these are dead-letter laws, they certainly harm the credibility and legitimacy of interventions that criticise state-sanctioned discrimination. Smith reinforced that there is no double standard when it comes to freedom of expression: there is one standard, and there are states across all regions and religious persuasions who fail to meet it.

So, where do we go from here? How can we take further steps towards realising the goals of Resolution 16/18, towards ameliorating the sectarian conflicts that continue to simmer and rage? What we can identify is a wealth of technical and normative guidance; the need for legal changes and a shift in attitudes; and a number of issues that inhere in the current treatment of the Istanbul Process. Thankfully, within these three broad categories lie the seeds of answers to each of them. Changes to legislation and attitudes can only be achieved with the employment of the instruments and guidelines that are available, and resolving the problems experienced in Jeddah will help create the space to do so. We do not need to develop new policies or guidelines, but instead need to build on and improve our application of those that already exist. While the debate over the bounds of freedom of expression will undoubtedly continue, the centralisation and increasing understanding of Resolution 16/18, the Rabat Plan and the Istanbul Process within the dialogue is an essential remedy to the potential resurgence of the defamation agenda.

It is worth noting, however, that these recommendations pertain to high level and legislative change. As members of an increasingly global society, we too have a role: to engage in inter-religious dialogue, to promote an environment of tolerance and respect, and to deliberately cast out stereotypes in favour of building the mutual understanding envisioned in Resolution 16/18.  As Marc Limon said, ‘the road to Istanbul is through Rabat’ – but you can take part in the journey.

For further information:

Andrew Smith @access2smith @article19un

Sejal Parmar @_SejalParmar

New Pieces on the International Chessboard

An Internationally-Active Sub-State: A Neglected Effect of Globalization?

Nicholas Gordon

Many important questions have been raised with the Scottish National Party’s recent electoral successes, but a question with repercussions beyond the United Kingdom concerns how a more autonomous Edinburgh will be treated by the international community. Even as independence is ruled out, greater Scottish authority is almost certain. And, with that local authority, will come greater international prominence.

But the United Kingdom is not the only place where a sub-state can have, or has had, an international impact. The past few years have seen crises that involve autonomous sub-state units as major players, from Catalonia and Crimea in Europe, Iraqi Kurdistan in the Middle East, and Hong Kong in East Asia. In all of these areas, significant and exceptional autonomy has allowed these units to act on the international stage. In addition, all of these regions interact with the international system without relying on state institutions—they are independent actors, at least in part.

It has been argued that globalization is transforming the state, as they become more disaggregated and its power is expressed across multiple institutions. Others argue that the state is being replaced with other kinds of actors, be it the non-territorial multinational corporation, non-governmental organization or terrorist group, or the supranational regional institution.

Globalization is transforming the state, as it becomes more disaggregated and its power is expressed across multiple institutions

But one class of political unit is often left out of these discussions: the sub-state, or those territorial political units that lie (or are recognized to be) within a state’s sovereign jurisdiction. As the international system becomes more connected, the sub-state can more easily and noticeably engage with the international system – be it through short-term political engagement, or longer-term institutional engagement. Increasingly global problems requires sub-states to engage with the international community to fully exercise their domestic authority, and the ease of international communication and travel means that sub-states can solve these problems without involving the state.

It is understandable why theoretical attention would go elsewhere. Supranational institutions can be seen as composites of sovereign members, even if they become actors in their own right, while MNCs and NGOs seem to exist “beyond” traditional sovereignty by virtue of being non-territorial. In contrast, sub-state units are decidedly not sovereign, by existing in a hierarchy with the state.

We can see this tension when looking at those units commonly called “de facto states”. Somaliland is a de facto state by virtue of Somalia’s complete collapse; while Taiwan’s and South Ossetia’s independence are bolstered by American and Russian protection respectively.  As sovereignty is seen to be intrinsically good in all cases, sub-states can only gather sovereignty against the state’s will, either from failed capacity or foreign protection.

However, this binary view ignores the avenues through which a sub-state can become an international actor. Take Hong Kong, whose autonomy is very much not a story about a lack of Chinese power. Two examples stand out: the Manila Hostage Crisis of 2010 (political engagement) and Edward Snowden’s 2013 escape to the city (institutional engagement).

Hong Kong’s response to the Manila hostage crisis was a deliberate attempt to effect change in a foreign country. In retaliation to a perceived botched response, Hong Kong placed sanctions on Filipino officials and a travel warning on the whole country — for a time, Hong Kong officially deemed the Philippines more unsafe than Syria. What fueled the government’s anger was a perceived snub by President Benigno Aquino who, rather than speaking directly to Hong Kong’s Chief Executive, instead summoned the Chinese Ambassador.

In contrast, Snowden’s escape to Hong Kong reveals more institutionalized engagement. Every step of Snowden’s escape to Hong Kong was facilitated by Hong Kong’s independent ‘foreign policy’. Snowden escaped to Hong Kong through its visa-waiver program with the United States; upon his arrival, Washington called on Hong Kong to honor its extradition treaty. Neither of these agreements exists between Washington and Beijing, arguably, do not exist between Hong Kong and Beijing.

Hong Kong, although quite extreme in its level of autonomy, is not the only example of a sub-state with international connections. Another, more complex, case is Iraqi Kurdistan, whose path to autonomy is a mix of foreign protection, a weakened state, and more efficient local capacity. Irbil has built strong economic and security links with surrounding countries. Most important of these is Turkey. Whereas Ankara initially refused to support any American intervention in Iraq if it led to an independent Kurdistan, it is now the biggest foreign investor in Iraqi Kurdistan and works with Irbil on security concerns.

The barriers preventing sub-states from engaging with the international system are slowly eroding

Many of these foreign connections — such as Irbil’s independent negotiation of oil rights — are developed in spite of Baghdad. However, it is also true that Kurdistan has yet to make a serious push towards independence beyond hypothetical statements. It is likely that Kurdistan’s international connections would vanish upon independence; it would be a certainty for Turkey, which is currently resolving its own Kurdish insurgency. Surprisingly, Kurdistan may be able to do more in practice if it remains a   highly autonomous part of Iraq than what it could do as an independent state.

It is this observation that points us towards the future. Kurdistan is not the only sub-state that has realized that both local authority and international engagement can be gained in spite of a lack of statehood, as Taiwan and Nagorno-Karabakh have come to similar conclusions. This is not to deny the real benefits and symbolic appeal of independence, but rather to argue that the structure of the international system allows sub-states to do a lot more now than they could before.

The barriers preventing sub-states from engaging with the international system are slowly eroding. There were initially few reasons why a sub-state would need to have an international presence, as few problems were global. Even when a sub-state needed to engage with the international system, the difficulty and expense of travel and communication meant that the sub-state would rely on state mechanisms. Combine this with a more absolutist view of the state, and sub-states had little ability, or need, to engage internationally.

Why would a state government suppress a sub-state’s attempts at economic diplomacy if it actually serves to bolster economic development?

Contrast this to today. International travel is cheap; international communication significantly more so. Problems and, more importantly, the solutions to those problems have an international dimension. It is not that the state is becoming less relevant, or is less capable of doing this work. Instead, it is easier for a sub-state to engage on its own, without needing to rely on the state.

Greater sub-state engagement will happen for all the same reasons that the world is supposedly becoming more globalized: easier communication, cheaper transportation, the spread of the international economy and the rise of truly global problems. As transnational networks grow, there are more avenues for a sub-state to engage with the international system. It also means that the benefits of allowing a sub-state to have this authority grows: why would a state government suppress a sub-state’s attempts at economic diplomacy if it actually serves to bolster economic development?

This is not to say that we will see an “explosion” of sub-state diplomacy, or that the state will disappear as a central actor. What we commonly understand to be diplomacy — leader-to-leader diplomacy and major diplomatic summits — will still likely be done on a state-to-state basis. But underneath that, where the nitty-gritty of day-to-day authority is expressed, will lie a whole panoply of connections, involving both state and sub-state.

The Rise of Cyber Warfare

The spread of international relations into the cyber realm will fundamentally change inter-state conflict by 2030

Isabella Steel

Technological development has been a defining feature of the twenty-first century. By 2030 its influence in the military sphere will be acutely evident, impacting relations and conflict between technologically sophisticated nations (particularly those geographically distant) with potentially devastating consequences. This article will explore how the adoption of cyber-weaponry as a hostile tool of sabotage and espionage by states will change the character of war and the relationship between citizens and government; alter the global power balance; and necessitate a reappraisal of laws and outlooks regarding traditional forms of conflict.

Once the hobby of largely benevolent, technologically inquisitive individuals, cyber-weaponry has been superseded not only by criminal and corporate groups, but by nation-states in international relations, often with hostile intent. In 2010 Stuxnet, allegedly a US-Israeli malware, ravaged Iran’s nuclear programme in what one computer security expert argued was tantamount to “physical damage”. Georgia similarly suffered crippling denial-of-service attacks traced to Russian Business Network – also said to possess strong links to the government – during the Russian invasion in 2008. The technological sophistication, plentiful resources and indiscriminate scope that governments enjoy renders cyber-weaponry a powerful tool at their disposal.

Violence will no longer be expressed through the bombing of a single school but the national networks in which all schools rely

Governments’ utilisation of cyber espionage and sabotage will fundamentally change the character of war. Far removed from Tennyson’s six-hundred soldiers who “flash’d all their sabres bare/flash’d as they turn’d in air/Sabring the gunners there”, physical proximity in conflict will cease, as will isolation of conflict to just military and political realms. Violence will no longer be expressed through the bombing of a single school or hospital, but the national networks on which all schools and hospitals rely will be compromised. Michelle Zook, a retired US squadron section commander, warned in 2015 that a “retaliatory denial of service attack this year might become a complete shutdown of a power grid within five years,” highlighting just one component of national infrastructures that may be targeted.

Indeed, the 2015 S4x15 Security Conference in Miami lamented the emergence of BlackEnergy malware, traced to Russian group Sandworm, which infiltrates critical infrastructure such as pipe lines and power generators. Popular involvement in inter-state conflict will also increase through state employment of civilian hackers, as in Russia and China. Crucially, unlike military and intelligence personnel, they are cheap, effective and can be disbanded and mobilised rapidly upon request.

Wider changes in the government-citizen relations will too be interesting to observe. North Korea and China, traditionally controlling online access as a tool of oppression, may be forced to relax Internet restrictions to facilitate the organic emergence of a computer literate and technologically innovative generation. Military force will also become increasingly futile if inter-state conflict becomes dictated in the cyber-realm. Government investment will necessarily shift from maintenance of military forces to development of cyber-weaponry, potentially rendering military-backed dictatorships harder to sustain.

Conflict will also become less clear-cut, with difficulty distinguishing between civilian/military cyber-networks; combatants/non-combatants; and legal/illegal infiltration of online systems. Identifying perpetrators and acts of cyber-conflict will be hard, particularly given consistent Russian and Chinese denial of cyber-crime. The lack of physical warning signs, such as an armed presence, and the ease of remote execution of cyber-sabotage, renders the traditional delineation of conflict along national boundaries increasingly difficult.

North Korea and China may be forced to relax Internet restrictions to facilitate the emergence of a computer literate generation

Cyber-warfare will accordingly upset the current global power structure. Since 1945, Western democracies have sought to avoid direct military confrontation with each other. The ease with which cyber-espionage translates into sabotage and averts traditional military violence may change this dynamic. David Gorodyanksky, CEO of private software developer AnchorFree, argues that since the US allegedly spied on Germany, they fundamentally have “no reason not to do the same.” Less developed countries will be also able to enjoy greater and disproportionate influence in the global power game: the cyber realm’s intended use to facilitate the easy spread of information has created an inherent imbalance in favour of the aggressor, as it is difficult to restrict global information flows. Organisations, corporations, and individuals thus have the potential to enjoy a major, global impact – such as Julian Assange, or Estonia’s outsized influence in global cyber-security policy discussions.

The proliferation of cyber-conflict could also change East-West relations. The technological parity of the East, and the widespread utilisation of cyber methods by China, Russia and North Korea may mean this newly characterised warfare gives them greater opportunity to exert global influence and bid for international ascendency. This may catalyse the shift of power to the East and the full emergence of China as a superpower.

Furthermore, cyber-warfare threatens to greatly perpetuate antipathy between the US and China. Indeed, East-West tensions have already been stirred by cyber-espionage due to its substitution for military conflict as a modern form of warfare. Heightened US-Russian antagonism has also raised fears: Russian Turla malware was discovered to have been targeting foreign agents of former Easter Bloc nations since 2010, while US cyber-security firm FireEye found evidence of the aforementioned Sandworm  spying on NATO members. Indeed, President Obama’s 2011 US Cyberspace Policy Review warned that cyber-weaponry poses “some of the most serious economic and national security challenges of the 21st century”. Moreover, a US Defence Department report published the same year declared that harmful cyber action could be met with a parallel response in another domain, illustrating how conflict could easily escalate. While cyber-espionage and sabotage are used by the West and East alike, the fact that the morality and accountability of cyber-criminals is often limited to that of the governments they serve – including North Korea, Russia and China –  is a chilling thought.

International attempts at resolution have been proffered, accompanied by widespread recognition that international laws of conflict must be adapted to extend beyond a military sphere. Firstly, engagement must be expanded to match the growth of the problem. The Global Commission of Internet Governance was established in January 2014 to restore public trust and engagement with the Internet. Meeting at The Hague in April 2015, it advocates greater public awareness of cyber-security practices and training of the software industry globally to encourage more secure networks.

That the morality and accountability of cyber-criminals is often limited to that of the governments they serve is a chilling thought

Secondly, the international legal framework must adapt. The US International Strategy for Cyberspace writes that, consistent with the UN Charter, states have “an inherent right to self-defence that aggressive acts in cyberspace may trigger.” Defining “aggressive acts” remains contentious, however: no standardised terminology exists, with understanding of terms such as ‘information’ or ‘cyber-attack’ varying globally. There must be agreement about how to characterize and categorize such terms, before wider policy can be articulated.

Thirdly, while there should be a determined focus on identifying shared global outlooks, cooperation is vital in the domestic sphere, with greater collaboration needed between corporations and national governments. In his 2015 State of the Union Address, President Obama called for legislation to bolster cyber-security across US government and private industrial spheres; shield from liability companies that inform government about computer threats; and force companies to be more forthcoming about loss of online consumer data. Such policies may be difficult to enforce, however, given American scepticism about federal government intervention.

It is hard to anticipate the true impact of cyber-weaponry in civil war or regional conflicts, especially in regions such as the Middle East where brutal physical atrocities seem likely to continue in the short-term. However, the rise of cyber espionage and cyber-weaponry will, by 2030, have fundamentally changed the character of war by placing all aspects of society under threat, and necessitating a reassessment of attitudes, accountability and conduct in inter-state relations.